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In most of the former Spanish colonies during the early and mid nineteenth century, 
national states were fragile institutions, regularly afflicted by civil war, rebellion, and 
bankruptcy (e.g., Safford 1987; Halperin Donghi 1973). Perhaps nowhere in Latin 
America was construction of a central state more difficult and prone to reversal than in 
Argentina. For much of the nineteenth century, attempts to build an  Argentine state 
ended in political fragmentation and civil war. 
This paper uses the Argentine case to explore the effects of peripheral status in the 
world-svstem on state formation. With independence and the end of Spanish controls on 
trade the economies of the former Spanish colonies became reoriented toward direct trade 
with the core areas of Northwestern Ecrope. This reorientation was uneven: some regions 
experienced export booms and others were marginalized. This paper develops the 
argument that regional dominant classes producing export staples had little to gain from 
the construction of central states with sovereignty over larger territories, and that 
attempts to build centra states could directly threaten such classes if their economic 
positions depended on privileged access to political power. I analyze relations between 
statemaking political elites and the export-oriented ranchers and merchants of Buenos 
Aires Province in newly independent Argentina, arguing that statemaking projects led to 
bitter conflict between state elites and the Buenos Aires dominant class in the mid-1820s, 
- 
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and that this conflict was an  important cause for the dissolution of the Argentine state in 
Peripheries. States. and Dominant C l a w  
Social scientists working within a world-system or dependency framework often see 
state action as  crucial to the protection and promotion of national economies within the 
world-system. Indeed, much of the story told by Immanuel Wallerstein in the first three 
volumes of The Modern World-Svstem concerns ways in which states attempted to 
promote the interests of dominant classes in competition with the dominant classes of other 
states (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989). Another strand in the dependency literature 
stresses state promotion of economic development within national territories (e.g. Evans 
1979; Rueschemeyer and Evans -1985). In general, however, Wallerstein and other 
students of the world-system have not taken the state seriously as  an anaivtic object in its 
own right. Nor have they treated state elites as  potentially autonomous actors; that is, as 
actors who sometimes have the motivation and capacity to implement projects of their own 
that are not derived from the interests and conflicts of groups outside the state (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 19 79, pp. 24-33; Skocpol 1985). When these 
scholars focus on states, they tend to see variation in states as  corresponding to different 
forms of dependent capitalism or as defined by conflict among classes shaped by the world- 
system (e.g. Braunmiihl 1978; Collier, ed. 1979; Hamilton 1982; 09Donnell 1973, 1977).~ 
Historical studies of dependency in Latin America also tend to reduce the activities 
of state elites to dynamics of the world-system or to class conflict. In a broad historical 
interpretation intended to answer earlier criticisms that dependency theory neglected class 
relations within dependent countries, Andre Gunder Frank (1972) sees Latin American 
states as  expressions.of class structures formed by dependency, and politics as reflecting 
conflict among classes and regions. In a long-run account of the origins of Latin American 
2. Some of the literature on "state capitalism" in peripheral areas does see state elites a s  
actors with interests of their own, but this literature tends to be rather narrowly focused 
on situations in which states are directly involved in production (Canak 1984, pp. 4-14). 
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dependency, Stanley and Barbara Stein (1970) are careful to distinguish the interests and 
projects of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns from those of economic elites during the 
colonial period, but they pay little attention to the statemaking initiatives of political elites 
after independence, instead emphasizing political consequences of dependent class 
structures and regional economic differentiation. 
In their account of Latin American dependency since independence, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) are widely considered to have overcome earlier 
problems in the theory by combining internal and external dynamics, accounting for 
qualitative variation in economies and social structures, and explaining how economic 
development ("dependent development") can occur within situations of dependency. 
Cardoso and Faletto pay close attention to political forces shaping dependency, and they 
acknowledge initiatives of state elites that are not reducible to class interests. However, 
they refer u, these initiatives in an ad hoc manner to explain specific events and do not 
include them in their more general theory, where they see states as reflecting class 
interests or particular balances of class and regional power.3 
The literature on Latin American dependency generally portrays the delayed 
consolidation of central states as  a result of interregional conflicts caused bv dependency. 
In discussions of the Argentine case, Buenos Aires Province, which was the principal 
beneficiary of direct trade with the core, is seen a s  dominating the rest of the country and 
ruining artisanal production in other provinces by introducing British manufactures 
(Alvarez 1914; Barba 1972; Burgin 1946; Cardoso and Faletto 1979, pp. 43-52; Corradi 
1983, pp. 320-327; Gunder Frank 1972, pp. 51-55). The resulting conflict between 
regions delayed consolidation of a durable national state until the late nineteenth century. 
Similar conflicts occurred in most other parts of Spanish America. Interregional conflict 
did hinder state formation, but dependency theory could contribute more to an explanation 
3. For example, they portray state elites as acting on their own initiative in their 
discussion of the "entrepreneurial" states of recent decades that are directly involved in 
production through public corporations, but they give no theoretical explanation for this 
state activity aside from a desire of state elites to stimulate economic development. 
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of delayed state formation in Latin America if it recognized the potential autonomy of 
states and state elites. 
Taking state elites seriously as  actors allows examination of ways in which 
dependency may shape relations between economic elites and state elites. In the following 
discussion, I use Charles Tilly's notion of "statemaking" to refer to the activities of political 
elites attempting to construct national states, and I use Maurice Zeitlin's concept of class 
"segments" to distinguish portions of dominant classes engaged in different forms of 
economic activity (Tilly 1975a, 1975b, 1985; Zeitlin 1980, pp. 25-28, 1984). I try to 
understand the effects of economic dependency on statemaking by considering ways in 
which the interests and actions of different segments of dependent dominant classes may 
constrain attempts to construct central states. 
The literature on state formation in core areas of Europe points to the mutually 
reinforcing development of capitalism and states, which implies a generally symbiotic 
relationship between state elites and dominant classes, especially capitalist or proto- 
capitalist classes. For states, capitalist development provided the increased production and 
revenue necessary for warfare, organizational rationalization, and intensified control over 
populations. For capitalists, states stimulated commodification and provided order, 
security of property, standard currencies, unified markets, and investment opportunities in 
the form of loans, provisioning contracts, and tax farms (Giddens 1967, pp. 148-160; Tilly 
1975a, pp. 72-73; Tilly 1985, pp. 178-180). 
There are several reasons for thinking that the relationship between dominant 
classes and emergent national states was weaker and more prone to disruption in Latin 
America than in Western Europe. To the extent that dominant classes derived their 
income from producing staples for the world market, they had less need for the national 
markets and unitary currency and legal systems provided by the existence of central 
states, and less need for the economic protection that central states could offer. They also 
had less need for the state a s  buyer of their products and as  an opportunity for investment 
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in forms such as loans and government bonds. Production of export staples did not 
preclude production for national markets or investment in states, but dominant classes 
deriving most of their income from production for the world market were likely to resist 
paying the costs of statemaking because their positions did not depend on the existence of 
central states. 
Although the central states and dominant classes of Latin America were less likely 
to develop symbiotically than those of the core, connections between dominant classes and 
local and regional state institutions tended to be tighter in Latin America. The economic 
positions of staple-exporting dominant classes often depended on direct access to local or 
regional political power. Export-oriented staple production was often associated with 
coercive forms of labor control, for which dominant classes had to either exercise local 
political power themselves or receive strong support from iocal a ~ t h o r i t i e s , ~  and 
expropriation of land from peasants and petty producers often required influence over 
judges and the police (e.g. LeGrand 1984). 
Nascent Latin American states not only demanded resources from dominant classes, 
but also could threaten forms of direct access to political power that  were crucial to these 
classes. Statemaking involved preemption of local and provincial powers, a s  well a s  
internal and external political conflict and even war, all of which could disrupt regional and 
local political arrangements supporting an export-oriented dominant class. Specific ways 
in which statemaking could threaten a staple-exporting dominant class were related to the 
forms of political power maintaining the economic position of this class, which in turn were 
strongly influenced by the nature of the specific commodities produced for the world 
- 
market, as well a s  the ecological context and social relations of their production.' 
4. The causal ordering of the relationship between peripheral status in the world-system 
and coerced labor remains controversial. Wallerstein (e.g. 1974, pp. 87-1191, Chirot 
(1975), Kolchin (1987): and Hall (1989, pp. 16-17) argue that  peripheralization leads to 
coerced labor, whereas Brenner (1977) argues that  areas where dominant classes have the 
pre-existing capacity to coerce labor are especially likely to be peripheralized. 
5. Social consequences of the ways in which particular primary commodities are  produced 
are examined in Bunker 1988; Hirschman 1981; Paige 1975, 1984; Stinchcombe 1961, 
1983. 
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Due to their external economic and political ties, the export-oriented dominant 
classes of Latin America also tended to have more power vis-A-vis central states than did 
the dominant classes of core countries. Thus statemaking elites in Latin America 
generally had less capacity to divert resources from dominant classes, a capacity which 
was important to the formation of central states in the core regions of Western Europe 
(Tilly 1975a). 
These ideas apply more to large peripheral states encompassing ecologically diverse 
territories with many productive regions than to small states, which may include only one 
such region. If a state claimed sovereignty over only one productive region, then it was a 
regional state and the dominant class of that region was likely to support its existence. 6 
The remainder of this paper explores the usefulness of this theoretical perspective to an 
understanding of relations between statemaking political elites and export-oriented 
segments of the dominant class in post-colonial Argentina. 
Case Selection. Data. and Methods 
This paper evaluates the ideas developed above by examining the extent to which 
they help explain relations between the national state and the dominant class of Buenos 
Aires Province prior to the disbandment of the Argentine state in the mid-1820s. Buenos 
Aires was politically and economically the most powerful of the Argentine provinces. It 
was also the principal center of cattle production for hide and salted meat exports, which 
increased dramatically during the same period that the first serious efforts were being 
made to build a national state. The expansion of cattle ranching involved a rapid 
reorientation of the Buenos Aires dominant class, which facilitates examination of the 
consequences of this export boom. Prior to independence the wealthiest residents of 
Buenos Aires were engaged almost exclusivel~7 in various forms of trade, and most 
6. This does not mean that states were necessarily consolidated earlier where they claimed 
smaller territories. Conflict between state elites and export-oriented dominant classes is 
only one of a number of possible impediments to statemaking. Uruguay, for example, was 
torn apart for much of the nineteenth century by a combination of elite factionalism and 
the interference of Argentina and Brazil. 
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members of the dominant class only began investing in cattle production after 
independence. The shift toward cattle ranching can thus be viewed as an "intervention" 
affecting attitudes of the dominant class toward the statemaking activities of political 
elites. 
The empirical evidence for this paper consists of qualitative and quantitative data 
drawn from Argentine archives, published primary sources, and the secondary historical 
literature. The qualitative data include debates of the National Constituent Congress of 
1824-1827, the correspondence of rural Justices of the Peace, newspaper reports, and the 
text of petitions sent to the national government. The quantitative data consist primarily 
of a sample of economic elites, for whom I have modelled the effects of involvement in 
various economic activities on the likelihood of signing an important petition sent to the 
. national government from residents of Buenos Aires Province shortly before the national 
government was dissolved. All of' this evidence is woven into an historical narrative 
structured by the general theoretical approach introduced above. The overall "test" of this 
approach, then, is to be found in the extent to which the resulting narrative is internally 
coherent and consistent with the Argentine evidence. In general terms, this theoretical 
framework leads to the expectation. that the rapid expansion of cattle ranching in post- 
colonial Buenos Aires was associated with increasing conflict between central-state elites 
and the dominant class of Buenos Aires Province, and that this conflict was particularly 
intense just before dissolution of the central state in 1827. 
The Expansion of Cattle Production in Buenos Aires Province 
Prior to independence rural Buenos Aires was marginal to the world-system. The 
city of Buenos Aires was primarily an entrepot for European trade with the silver- 
producing regions of Upper Peru (later Bolivia). Exports of hides and other cattle products 
from rural Buenos Aires to Europe were sporadic, although tending to increase, in the era 
of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, which lasted from 1776 to 1810 (Giberti 1970, 
pp. 45-81; Montoya 1970; Villalobos R. 1986). Although some large-scale ranching 
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operations did exist in this period, much of the rural population in areas under Spanish 
control was engaged in small scale, semi-nomadic cattle raising, which provided most of 
their subsistence needs and produced some income from the sale of cattle and hides 
(Cdrcano 1917; Garavaglia 1987; Azcuy Ameghino and Martinez Dougnac 1989; Mayo 
and Latrubesse de Dias unpublished). The majority of the present-day Province of Buenos 
Aires was occupied by Amerindian groups who were not dominated by Spaniards (Halperin 
Donghi 1969b; Zimmerman 1945). 
Demand for hides grew during the Viceroyalty because of increasing European and 
North American shoe production, the growth of European industry, which used leather 
belts and hoses, and the expansion of European armies, which required boots and other 
leather articles (Brown 1979. pp. 50-58). However, silver remained the principal export of 
Buenos Aires merchants, and Spanish restrictions impeded trade with Northwestern 
Europe, where the principal markets for hides were located (Socolow 1978). Independence 
(which began, de facto, in 1810) brought both free international trade and the collapse of 
the silver trade--due to the disruption of war and the withdrawal of Upper Peru from 
Argentina (Halperin Donghi 1975; 1985). Buenos Aires Province became more tightly 
connected to the world economy and less connected to the economies of the other Argentine 
provinces. 
The shift of the dominant class toward production and export of cattle products after 
independence was probably hastened by the growing predominance of resident foreign 
merchants, especially British merchants, in the import of manufactured goods from 
Europe. Many Buenos Aires merchants were already investing in ranches during the 
1810s, and this process accelerated during the 1820s. Import-export and wholesale 
merchants who claimed land tended to claim much more than other land claimants, and 
many of them became large-scale ranchers within a few years during the mid-1820s. 7 
Hides were the most important export, but some wealthy merchants and ranchers also 
7. Data.on land claims are published in Carretero 1970a. See also Table 2 below. 
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started factories b laderos)  to produce salted meat, which was exported to Cuba and 
Brazil to be used a s  food for slaves.' By the mid-1820s, it was clear that the best long 
term investment opportunities in the province were in ranching and salted meat production 
(Giberti 1970; Halperin Donghi 1969a; Montoya 1970). 
State elites actively promoted the interests of large ranchers. They undertook 
campaigns against the Indians to conquer more land, and gave out vast tracts of public 
land on'long-term leases a t  low rates (Carretero 1970a; Coni 1927; Oddone 1975). In an 
attempt to force rural inhabitants onto the labor market, they passed a series of vagrancy 
laws and restrictions on mobility and independent economic a c t i ~ i t i e s . ~  Thus, in a process 
which began slowly in the colonial era and accelerated after independence, rural Buenos 
Aires underwent what Wallerstein calls "incorporation" and "peripheralization" (1989, pp. 
'129-131). Buenos Aires cattle ranching became "integral to various of the commodity 
chains that constitute the ongoing division of labor of the capitalist world-economy" 
(Wallerstein 1989, p. 130j. 
Success in large-scale cattle ranching depended on the ability to influence political 
P 
authorities, judges, and the police. Buenos Aires cattle ranching was associated with 
chronic labor shortage because the province was thinly settled and, despite laws intended 
to force them to sell their labor, the rural lower classes had many 'possibilities for 
independent economic activity. To obtain labor, a large rancher had to build patronage 
relations with the local population, allowing those who were reliable workers to farm or 
graze cattle on his land and sheltering them from strict enforcement of vagrancy and pass 
laws, which required the capacity to influence Justices of the Peace and Police 
Commissioners. 10 
8. Various other animal products, such as tallow and horsehair, were also exported, but 
their total value was relatively small. 
9. A collection of these laws, along with instructions for their enforcement, is found in 
Buenos Aires 1825. 
10. Monsma (1988) discusses the selective enforcement of vagrancy laws and other legal 
restrictions on the rural population. On the social organization of cattle ranching in 
general see Baretta and Markoff 1978; Bishko 1952; 1963; Otto and Anderson 1986; 
Strickon 1965. For an overview of recent work on rural Buenos Aires in the late colonial 
10 
Acquiring and maintaining official title to land had long depended on political 
influence (Circano 1917; Giberti 1970). Because ranching methods were land-extensive, 
fences unknown, and land claims vaguely defined, large ranchers relied on regular access 
to courts, police, and Justices of the Peace to defend their claims to land and cattle. 64 
civil court cases concerning rural land were initiated in Buenos Aires Province during the 
1810s, and 205 such cases were initiated during the 1820s, an increase which corresponds 
to the expansion of cattle ranching in this period.'' These data include only part of the 
ranching-related litigation. Civil courts also decided many cases in which individuals were 
accused of slaughtering stray cattle, failure to deliver purchased cattle, branding the calves 
of neighbors' cows, or monopolizing watering places. Many minor disputes never reached 
the court system because they were decided informally by Justices of the Peace (Diaz 
1959). 
Statemaking 
The violent struggle for Argentine independence produced an unusually self-conscious 
statemaking elite. Although members of this elite. like the large ranchers, were ,generally 
children of the merchants and royal bureaucrats who were the most important upper class 
groups of colonial Buenos Aires, they themselves tended to be lawyers, clerics, and 
military officers, and had devoted much of their adult lives to what was then called "the 
career of the revolution" (Galmarini 1974, pp. 14-15; Halperin Donghi 1985, pp. 161-165). 
The statemaking elite of Buenos Aires was thus linked to the dominant class through ties 
of kinship and common culture, but the activities which were most central to their own 
lives and their principal sources of income were different from those of large ranchers and 
merchants. 
and early national periods, see Anuario (Instituto de Estudios Histdrico-Sociales, Tandil) 
1987. Other important work on the subject includes Brown 1979; Giberti 1970; Halperin 
" Donghi 1969a; Mayo 1984; Montoya 1984; Rodriguez Molas 1982; Slatta 1983. 
11. I am grateful to Eduardo Sap ie r  for giving me these data. 
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The most active and best organized political group of the 1810s and 1820s centered on 
Bernardino Rivadavia, who was secretary of the first governing Triumvirate in the early 
1 8 1 0 ~ ~  Minister of Government of Buenos Aires Province in the early 1 8 2 0 ~ ~  and 
President of the short-lived national government of the mid-1820s. The "Rivadavian 
group," as  Sergio BagG has called them, had strong ideological motivation. Influenced by 
enlightenment writers, especially Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and James Mill, and 
inspired by the models of Great Britain, revolutionary France, and the United States, this 
political elite rejected the Spanish colonial past and attempted to stimulate capitalist 
development and build a strong Argentine state. The goals of economic development and 
statemaking were interrelated: a strong national state was considered necessary to provide 
social order, a national market, and the infrastructure for economic development economic 
development was considered necessary to legitimate the central state, increase its revenue, 
and strengthen its mil~tary capacity (Bag4 1966). 
This state elite thus exemplified many of the characteristics identified by Skocpol as 
likely to lead to autonomous action, approximating "a strategically located cadre of officials 
enjoying great organizational strength inside and through existing state organizations and 
also enjoying a unified sense of ideological purpose about the possibility and desirability of 
using state intervention to ensure political order and promote national economic 
development" (Skocpol 1985, pp. 9-10). Due to both their common background and the 
revenue derived from exports, political elites generally supported the interests of large 
ranchers and merchants, but there was also potential for conflict between state elites and 
the Buenos Aires dominant class if the process of constructing a national state damaged 
the ranching economy. 
Parts of the upper class supported early attempts a t  statemaking. A group of 
wealthy Buenos Aires merchants had major investments in financing and provisioning the 
national state, and therefore had a direct interest in its successful consolidation. Members 
of this group negotiated a large loan to the government from British sources, helped form 
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the first Argentine banks, and endeavored to contract with the national government for 
large-scale public works projects such as the construction of a port in Buenos Aires 
(Galmarini 1974). During the 1820s, however, high rates of profit in ranching led this 
group of capitalists to acquire a substantial community of interest with large ranchers as  
they began investing in ranch land and starting their own ranches (Galmarini 1974, pp. 
31-40; Oddone 1975). Of the 14 men that Hugo Galmarini has identified as  investing 
heavily in state finance and infra-structural projects in the 1820s, 7 had acquired large 
tracts of ranch land (at least 5 square leagues) by the end of 1826, claiming an average of 
30.9 square Spanish leagues (322 square miles) apiece (Carretero 1970a; Galmarini 1974, 
pp. 15-16). 
The national government squabbled with parts of the Buenos Aires dominant class 
over several issues, inciuding replacement of tne Bank of Buenos Aires by a national bank, 
control over the Famatima silver mines in La Rioja Province, and the amount u, be paid 
for leasing public land (Bag6 1966; Burgin 1946; Galmarini 1974). Each of these conflicts 
ended in compromise. Two political projects, however. brought the statemaking elite into 
severe and irreconcilable conflict with the dominant class of Buenos Aires Province during 
the mid-1820s. These projects were a war with Brazil and an attempt to make the city of 
Buenos Aires the national capital and divide the remainder of Buenos Aires Province into 
two smaller provinces. 
The War with Brazil and the Conscript 
. . ion Issue 
The war with Brazil was an attempt to recover the Banda Oriental (later Uruguay), 
which was claimed by both Argentina and Brazil and had been under Portuguese and then 
Brazilian occupation since 1820. The war began with the rebellion of the area against 
Brazilian rule in 1825.12 With sovereignty over the Banda Oriental, the Argentine state 
12. The expedition of the "33 orientales" which initiated the rebellion was financed in part 
by some prominent Buenos Aires ranchers, who probably had claims to land in the Banda 
Oriental (Halperin Donghi 1985, p. 222). For reasons discussed below, however, ranchers 
soon lost enthusiasm for the war. 
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would control both sides of the Rio de la Plata, which linked a vast and fertile territory 
with the Atlantic Ocean by way of the Parani  and Uruguay river systems. The territory 
dependent on these rivers for communication with the outside world included the present- 
day Argentine provinces of Santa F6, Entre Rios, Corrientes: Chaco, Formosa, and 
Misiones, a s  well as  the country of Paraguay and parts of southern Brazil. 
The Rivadavian political elite considered control over the Banda Oriental to be 
crucial to consolidation of an Argentine nation-state. As Julian Segundo de Agiiero, the 
Minister of Government, put it in during a debate of the National Constituent Congress in 
mid- 1826: 
This war will decide the fate of the Republic and, either we win it or we will 
not be a nation, because it is not possible for there to be tranquil security of 
our liberty nor of our prosperity, if the usurper continues to dominate the 
Banda Oriental, because he will then have the key to the door for entering this 
territory. Thus we must either triumph or cease to exist a s  a nation 
(Ravignani ed. '1937, Vol 3, p. 346). 
Another argument in favor of military intervention, propounded in secret sessions of the 
Congress, was the importance of not allowing the inhabitants of the Banda Oriental to 
defeat the Brazilians on their own, which might lead them to declare independence from 
Argentina (Archivo Hist6rico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 1936, pp. 219-220). Victory 
in this war also could have increased the. capacities of the Argentine state to extract 
resources and men, capacities often strengthened by war (Finer 1975; Tilly 19 75a). 
Parts of the Buenos Aires upper class profited from the war. Some merchants went 
into privateering, and merchants with large stockpiles of goods were able to charge 
elevated prices when Brazil blockaded the port of Buenos ~ i r e s . ' ~  Some large ranchers 
probably took advantage of depressed prices to buy up the cattle and land of smaller 
ranchers less able to survive the blockade. Most of the Buenos Aires dominant class was 
13. According to The British Packet and Argentine News (September 22, 1827),-"A11 the 
goods existing in the different warehouses are objects of competition: the ounces appear to 
have a wish to quit our territory, and to signalize their last moments by a most scandalous 
price. The bank does not cease to discount; in private transactions the interest of money is 
increasing hourly--here they are bargaining for privateer shares--there they are drawing 
up proposals for a new loan;--in short, the streets in the centre of the town are so many 
Lombard Streets ..." 
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hurt by the war, however. This was particularly true for large ranchers. Not only were 
they hurt by the blockade, but the state also infringed on their interests more directly 
through diversion of frontier troops to the war and through massive conscription of rural 
workers. By mid-1825, ranchers were already complaining about the removal of frontier 
troops, which made them vulnerable to Indian raids (Archivo Hisdrico de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires 1936, pp. 9, 185). 
Large ranchers had relied on selective conscription of "vagrants" to force rural 
inhabitants onto the labor market. During the war, however, rural lower class males were 
indiscriminately forced into military service.14 In addition to losing workers to the press 
gangs, large ranchers lost the authority over workers and other rural people that they had 
gained by providing protection from conscription. 
Massive conscription provoked an outpouring of protest from the countryside. 
Vicente Gonzalez, the Justice of the Peace of the partido of Monte, wrote to the President 
in mid-1826 complaining that a recruiting party: "violating the houses of the peaceful 
inhabitants of this area, took them out and made them take out the peons who were 
sleeping, without sparing honest men nor peons under contract." The residents of the area 
had come to him: "[some] demanding their peons, others their sons, due to the helpless 
state in which they were 1eft."l5 The Minister of Government wrote back asserting the 
priority of state interests over the interests of individuals of all classes: 
An indispensable and urgent necessity, above all other considerations, 
demands that. the government take serious and also harsh measures to 
obtain men.... This necessity is painful, but it is unavoidable that it be 
fulfilled, just as  it is also unavoidable that all inhabitants of the State 
resign themselves to making a sacrifice at least once;.., [which is] 
14. Blanket impressment was sanctioned by a law of January, 1826, which authorized the 
executive branch to recruit men for military service "by the means it considers best for the 
defense of the Republic" (Ravignani ed. 1937, Vol. 2, p. 619). Conscription efforts were 
particularly intense in Buenos Aires Province because the central state exercised direct 
power there after the provincial lepslature was closed in early 1826 (by the law that made 
the city of Buenos Aires the national capital). Recruitment in the other provinces was in 
the hands of provincial governments, which were slow to respond to the call for men 
(Archivo Histdrico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 1936, pp. 184-185). 
15. Justice of the Peace of Monte to President of the Republic, undated. Archivo General 
de la Naci6n (hereinafter AGN), Sala X, 13-9-4: Justicia 1826. 
unavoidable in the critical state of war in which the nation finds itself; a 
war to which, in any case, everyone should contribute. 16 
In March of 1827, residents of the partido of Pergamino brought a petition to the 
local Justice of the Peace, which they asked him to forward to the President of the 
Republic. The petition stated..thai the military was enlisting "the only sons of widows 
burdened with family, ranch foremen, property owners, peons and even 14-year-old 
youths. How is i t  possible to believe, Sir Judge, that  this decision can be from the 
President of the &public? No doubt this must be a mistake of those in charge [of 
conscription]." The problem was exacerbated by the fact that  Pergamino bordered on the 
Province of Santa Fe', where conscription was more limited. The petition complained of: 
... the horrible emigration that  is happening. Since the enlistment day more 
than seventy familles have moved to the Province of Santa FB. Every day 
the ranch peons go on disappearing, and soon we shall find ourselves 
without a man.... (Iin addition to being without their labor, we daily suffer 
theft of our herds without being able to guard against it. l7 
Santa Fe' was not the only place of refuge for those fleeing the military. 'Communities of 
refugees and deserters sprang up in the Parana' River delta and the forest and swampland 
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by the Atlantic Ocean known as  the Monte de Tordillo, where they supported themselves 
by hunting and selling firewood and charcoal (Rodriguez Molas 1982, p. 151). Those 
evading conscription could also make for t h e  frontier or join Indian bands, a practice 
common among frontier renegades (Mayo and Latrubesse de Diaz unpublished). It is quite 
likely that  more peons fled to escape the press gangs than were conscripted. The effects of 
impressment on the rural labor force were thus magnified, leading to a situation conveyed 
in stark terms by the English newspaper of Buenos Aires: "[Flor the space of 50 leagues 
around the city, a peon is scarcely to be seen; and numerous Estancias [ranches] and 
Chacras [farms] are  left entirely destitute of effective servants" (The British Packet and 
Argentine News, August 26, 1826). 
16. Rough draft of letter from Minister of Government to Justice of the Peace of Monte, 
August 24, 1826. AGN Sala X, 13-9-4, Justicia 1826. 
17. Ranchers, citizens and inhabitants of Pergamino to Justice of the Peace of Pergamino, 
March 10, 1827. AGN Sala X, 14-76 ,  Tribunal de Justicia, Jueces de Paz 1827. 
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Cattle theft increased dramatically during the war. When ranch peons fled, herds 
scattered and became easy targets for petty rustlers, whose numbers were greatly 
increased by the many deserters and refugees from conscription crossing the countryside. 
The disruption caused by conscription led some ranchers and ranch administrators to 
refuse cooperation with authorities involved in recruitment efforts, and it is quite likely 
that they hid deserters and refugees who agreed to work for them.'' 
At the height of conscription efforts in late 1826, a brief insurrection shook the 
countryside west of Buenos Aires City. On December 13 a "considerable number of men, 
the greater part of them outlaws and criminals," invaded the country town of Navarro, 
where they deposed the local authorities and appointed new ones. They then augmented 
their numbers with local inhabitants and attacked the town of' Lujan the next morning, 
where they were defeated by the militia. At his trial the leader of the band. Cipriano 
Benitez, who "was a t  one time the owner of a considerable property in the country," stated 
that he was supported by "several respectable citizens of Buenos Ayres, among whom 
were several deputies of Congress," as  well as by the governors of Santa FC and Cordoba 
provinces, and that his objective had been to overthrow the national government a 
Dec. 16, 1826; Jan. 20, 1827)." 
The war with Brazil thus undermined the legitimacy of the national government 
among all rural classes. For the poor, the war brought the threat of conscription; for the 
propertied, it brought severe labor shortage and rampant crime. 
18. In March of 1827, the new Justice of the Peace of Monte wrote to the Minister of 
Government complaining that he had tried to form a night patrol to preserve order and 
catch deserters, but that some of the most important inhabitants, including Vicente 
Gonza'lez. the former Justice of the Peace, had refused to cooperate (Justice of the Peace of 
Monte to Minister of Government,. March 13, 1827. AGN, Sala X, 14-7-5, Tribunal de 
Justicia. Jueces de Paz 1827). 
19. Benitez was executed and his body displayed on the gallows in Lujan. Participants in 
this uprising may also have responded to longer-standing grievances about economic 
change in the countryside, as Benitez had also intended to "sack all the property of the 
foreigners established in the country." 
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The Conflict Over Capitalizing the Citv and Dividing the Province 
The other major conflict between political elites and the Buenos Aires dominant class 
concerned proposals to make Buenos Aires City the national capital and divide the rest of 
Buenos Aires Province into two new provinces. Those in charge of the national 
government in the mid-1820s considered the law making the city of Buenos Aires the 
national capital of fundamental importance to consolidation of the central state. In 
presenting the proposed law to the ~ a t i o n a l  Constituent Congress in February of 1826, the 
Minister of Government stated that it was the "basis for organization of the national 
government" ( ~ a v i ~ n a n i ,  ed. 1937, Vol. 2, p. 697). This law provided a geographic 
location for the institutions of the central state and gave it control over the customs 
revenue of the port of Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires Province would lose these resources, 
and state elites thought this fact would increase support for the central state among other 
provinces: "[Wlhen the other peoples of the Union see that it is the Province of Buenos 
Aires that, a t  first glance, appears to suffer such enormous harm, they will not refuse to 
enter the [national] organization ..." (Ravignani, ed. 1937, Vol. 2, p. 793). In spite of 
strong opposition from the Buenos Aires delegation. the Congress eventually passed this 
law. 
Several months later the executive branch proposed dividing the rest of Buenos Aires 
Province into two provinces, stating that the territory in question was large and there was 
no centrally located town that would make a good capital, whereas such towns did exist in 
the north and south of the territory. Probably more important, however, was the fact that 
division would eliminate the Buenos Aires provincial state, which was powerful enough to 
obstruct action by the national government and to arouse fears in other provinces that 
Buenos Aires would dominate the national state. The two new provinces would be easy for 
the central state to control. As the Commission on Constitutional Affairs stated in its 
favorable decision on the project: "[Tlhe new provinces will be a useful example, in their 
organization, in their union with and obedience to the capital, that will call out in a 
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practical way to all [the other provinces] to enjoy the same benefits" (Ravignani, ed. 1937, 
Vol. 3, p. 1173).~O 
The dominant class of Buenos Aires Province had reason to oppose both division of the 
province and capitalization of the city. Historians have tended to pay more attention to 
the capitalization issue than to the issue of dividing the rest of the province, claiming 
especially that large ranchers feared the imposition of new provincial land taxes if Buenos 
Aires lost control of the customhouse (e.g. Lynch 1981). There is every indication, 
however, that opposition to the planned division of rural Buenos Aires was stronger than 
opposition to capitalization of the city. In the national congress, deputies threatened that 
division of the province would lead to civil war, and signatures were gathered throughout 
the province on a petition opposing this plan (Ravignani, ed. 1937, Vol. 3, p. 11821. 
These two measures should be considered jointly. Both of' them divided the territory 
of Buenos Aires Province and radically rearranged political jurisdictions in this territory. 
An important clue to the strength of opposition can be found in the fact that most 
important ranchers lived in the city of Buenos Aires, not on their ranches, which were run 
by ranch administrators. Many of them were still engaged in commerce as  well a s  
ranching and had to spend much of their time in the city. Even ranchers who were not 
also merchants generally preferred life in the city to the rigors of the frontier, where they 
were exposed to Indian raids, where schools and doctors were scarce, and where there 
were no diversions comparable to the cafes and theaters of the city. 
These proposals threatened to move political and judicial institutions from the city of 
Buenos Aires to the country towns that were to become capitals of the new provinces, 
which would make access to these institutions more difficult for residents of the city. To 
use vagrancy laws and selective conscription to control rural workers, large ranchers had 
to be able to influence rural Justices of the Peace and Police Commissioners, which was 
20. The commission's decision was signed by two representatives from Buenos Aires, who 
were priests and loyal supporters of the Rivadavia government, and by three 
representatives from interior provinces (Bagi 1966, p. 93). 
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facilitated by location of the provincial Chief of Police and higher levels of the court system 
in Buenos Aires City. Routine access to courts was particularly important for protection of 
land claims and success in the many disputes between neighbors that arose on the 
unfenced plains. All major disputes were tried in the city of Buenos Aires, which provided 
an advantage to litigants who lived in the city. The proposed dlvision of the province thus 
threatened important forms of preferential access to the provincial and local state on which 
members of the dominant class relied to protect their interests. 
The principal organizers of the petition against division were Juan Manuel de Rosas, 
an important salted meat producer and rancher, and his cousin Nicolas Anchorena, who, 
along with his brother Juan Jose Cristobal, had claimed about 174 square Spanish 
leagues, or 1,815 square miles, of ranch land by this time (Carretero 1 9 7 0 a j . ~ ~  The text 
of the petition highlights relations between the countryside and rich residents of the city: 
Pick up from the country all the capital belonging to the residents of Buenos 
Aires [City], shut it up in the city, and collect with it all of the population 
that they maintain in the countryside at their expense, and immediately 
the imagination will not find in the vast territory that is going to be made 
into two provinces anything more than an almost deserted area, or an area 
with a scarce, poor and insignificant population .... [Tlhe countryside of 
Buenos Aires is in all of its essential relations a dependency of this city 
(Archivo Histdrico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 1949, p. 280). 
The petition only briefly mentions the possibility of new taxes, but it reveals a central 
preoccupation with the consequences of separate judicial systems located in the capitals of 
the new provinces: 
The biggest capitalists of the two provinces, by reason of residence will 
have their natural judges in Buenos Aires [City], and by the location of 
their properties will have them in ChascomGs or in San Nicolss [the new 
capitals]. If they have to pursue litigation in one of these towns, in addition 
to the disturbances they will experience as  a result of being there, and the 
cost of retaining counsel, they will have to commission k n c a r ~ d  their 
defenses in Buenos Aires, and send them [to these towns] with the 
repeated expense of timely shipments (Archivo Hist6rico de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires 1949, p. 281). 
2 1. Rosas would become dictator of Buenos Aires Province in the 1830s and rule the 
province for two decades. 
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Residents of the countryside, according to this petition, came to the city from time to time 
for economic reasons anyway, and thus were not hurt by centralization of the court 
system. 
Rural inhabitants did not necessarily view themselves a s  simple dependents of 
wealthy urban residents. The countryside contained many small and medium-sized 
ranching operations, as  well as, in areas closer to the city and around country towns, 
many small farmers. Unlike the issue of massive conscription, which cut across class lines 
in the countryside, the issue of making two new provinces out of rural Buenos Aires 
divided the dominant class from smaller ranchers and from farmers, particularly, it seems, 
those living close to Chascom6s or San Nicola's, the towns designated as  capitals of the 
new provinces. Merchants and artisans living in these towns also stood to gain if the 
province were divided. In fact. when Rosas tried to collect signatures against division in 
Chascomus he was temporarily imprisoned by local authorities for causing a disturbance 
(Lynch 1981). 
Two counter-petitions supporting division of the province were circulated in the 
countryside. One counter-petition, which originated in the Chascomus area, begins by 
stating that the petition against division was "signed by a kind of oligarchy, or conspiracy 
of powerful men of that capital [city], who by surprise demand the signatures of the 
unwary and ignorant .... [Tlhe audacity of this oligarchy has reached such a point that they 
want us all to submit our rights to the convenience of fifteen or twenty men" (Archivo 
Histdrico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 1949, pp. 286-287).22 This petition also 
highlights the issue of access to courts, stating that the difficulty of litigation in country 
22. This may well have been the first time that the word "oligarchy" was used in 
Argentine political discourse. La  Gaceta Mercantil. the principal newspaper of the Buenos 
Aires merchant community, published a "Notice to Public Opinion" stating that the 
Chascomus petition was signed by "many underaged gulperia [general store] helpers, 
some foreigners, and the Portuguese prisoners that are there" (December 4, 1826). If, as 
I suspect, many shopkeepers and the like signed this petition, they probably did have their 
dependents and employees sign it a s  well. I t  is also likely that large ranchers and 
merchants who signed the petition against dividing the province had their peons and 
dependents sign that petition. 
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towns for powerful urban residents "is not comparable to what is suffered [under the 
existing system] by all the residents of the countryside, poor a s  they say, with the 
abandonment of their families a t  great distances, without connections or means of 
attaining them or means of subsistence. Thus it is that because of these obstacles their 
justice almost always perishes" (Archivo Histdrico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 1949, 
p. 2 9 0 ) . ~ ~  
Who O p ~ s e d  Divkion of the Province? 
Given the extent to which the economy of the province had come to depend on cattle 
production, processing, and export by the mid-1820s, it is reasonable to expect that all 
segments of the Buenos Aires dominant class would tend to oppose division. However, 
those who lived in the.city but carried out. economic activities in the countryside should 
have been particularly likely to oppose division. More specifically, those who were more 
directly tied to rural economic activities and those engaged in rural activities for which 
influence over political authorities, judges, and the police were more important should have 
been more likely to oppose division than other members of the dominant class. To examine 
empirically which segments of the Buenos Aires dominant class tended to oppose division 
of the .province, I have taken a sample of economic elites and linked the names of 
individuals in the sample to signatures on the petition against division. 
The sample consists of individuals who either possessed five square Spanish leagues 
or more of land, were registered import-export merchants, owned wholesale operations, 
owned salted meat factories,24 or owned hide warehouses. The sources for the sample 
23. Jueces de Primera Instancia, the judges who ruled on major civil disputes, had in fact 
been stationed in ChascomGs and San Nicolds between 182 1 and 1824, after which they 
were again withdrawn to the city of Buenos Aires. In 1825 residents of ChascomGs and 
surrounding areas sent a petition to the provincial legislature (Junta de Representantes) 
asking that judges be located in the country towns again (Archivo Histdrico de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires C48-4-37, No. 259). 
24. Due u, the nature of the sources, it is not always possible to distinguish managers of 
salted meat factories from owners. The majority of these establishments, however, were 
managed by their owners, and the managers who were not owners should probably be 
included in the sample of economic elites in any case. 
and individual variables are listed in Table 1. The data are discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix A. For purposes of this analysis women and those identified as foreigners were 
excluded from the sample. Although women did own property, they were generally 
excluded from direct participation in politics. In fact, no woman signed any of the petitions 
opposing or favoring division of the province. Although foreign men were not excluded 
from Buenos Aires politics, the majority of the resident foreign merchants seem to have 
refrained from direct political involvement. Only 2 of the 93 individuals in the original 
sample identified as  foreigners signed one of these petitions. After exclusion of women 
and foreigners, the sample consists of 396 individuals. 
This is not a 100% sample because the lists of economic elites from which the sample 
is constructed are not complete for reasons discussed in Appendix A. Due to the 
incompleteness of these lists, variant spellings of names, and false matches of common 
names, there is a certain amount of random error in all of the variables, which means that 
the estimates presented below are probably somewhat attenuated. Fortunately all of the 
petition signatures seem to have survived, and there is no particular reason to believe 
that, within categories formed by the different economic activities, likelihood of exclusion 
from the sample is associated with propensity to sign the petition. Thus it is not likely 
that the estimates are much affected by selection bias (Berk 1983). 
Because the sample consists entirely of economic elites, it is unlikely that systematic 
differences in proclivity to sign the petition are due mainly to either solicitation of 
signatures through social networks or a tendency for important people to be 
overrepresented among signers of most petitions. Everyone in the sample was important 
and belonged to upper class social networks. In any case, signatures were collected a t  
public meetings and those who promoted the petition attempted to collect as  many 
signatures as  possible, seeking to impress the Congress with the number of signatures as 
well as the importance of the signers. 
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About 18% of those in the sample signed the petition opposing division of the province, 
but only 2% signed one of the counter-petitions in support of division. This difference 
constitutes good evidence that the dominant class of the province was much more likely to 
oppose division than to favor it. The rest of this analysis examines the relative propensity 
of different segments of the dominant class to sign the petition against division. 
The independent variables correspond to the principal economic divisions within the 
Buenos Aires upper class. Most major merchants were engaged in either the import- 
export trade or wholesaling. Import-export merchants imported foreign manufactured 
goods, especially British cloth, and exported raw materials, especially hides and salted 
meat. Although Buenos Aires was the primary market for imported goods, many of these 
merchants also transhipped imported manufactures to other Argentine provinces (Halperin 
Donghi 19 75, 1985; Brown 19793. 25 To the extent that import-export merchants were 
engaged in trade with other Argentine provinces, they stood to gain from the suppression 
of internal customs barriers and improvement of inter-regional communications that were 
likely to accompany consolidation of a central state, and may have felt hesitant to oppose 
central-state elites in the conflict over division. The economies of the interior decayed 
rapidlv after independence, however, due especially to the end of trade with Upper Peru, 
and the value of European imports that the interior could absorb declined over 
Import-export merchants found themselves placing an increasing proportion of their 
imports in the booming Buenos Aires market and earning an increasing proportion of their 
income by exporting cattle products from Buenos Aires. They thus had contradictory 
interests with respect to the issue of dividing the province, and it is impossible to have 
- 2 5 .  The actual importation of British goods was often done in partnership with British 
merchants. 
26. This was particularly true of the landlocked interior, which did not produce anything 
that was easily exported to pay for British imports. The provinces along the river system 
formed by the Rio de la Plata and the Parani and Uruguay rivers produced cattle 
products, but ranching in these areas was devastated by the war of independence and 
subsequent internal conflicts (Halperin Donghi 1975). 
2 4 
clear expectations about the net effect of being an import-export merchant on the likelihood 
of signing the petition against division. 
Wholesale merchants sold to the myriad of small retail outlets, general stores, and 
trading posts in the city and province of Buenos Aires. Some of them also purchased hides 
and other products, such as  pelts and rhea feathers, in the countryside for sale to 
exporters (Brown 1979). Wholesale merchants depended on the prosperity of the Buenos 
Aires cattle industry to sell their goods, and thus had reason to oppose division. 
The most industrial branch of the cattle complex consisted of salted meat factories, or 
saladeros, where crews of men slaughtered cattle and stacked layers of meat and salt in 
the sun to dry. Saladero owners needed agents and contacts in the countryside to 
purchase cattle and drive them to the outskirts of Buenos Aires city, where most saladeros 
were located. They also needed arrangements for fattening cattle before slaughter in fields 
near the saladeros. Because almost all of these establishments were located in or near the 
city, their owners could better litigate disputes thgre than in country towns. Saladero 
owners thus had a strong interest in maintaining both the political unity of Buenos Aires 
Province and the centralization of the court system in Buenos Aires City, which leads to 
the expectation that being a saladero owner had a strongly positive effect on the likelihood 
of signing the petition against division. 
Warehousing of hides in preparation for export was another branch of the cattle 
industry. Because hide warehouse owners had no need for delivery of cattle on the hoof, 
they were much less vulnerable than saladero owners to disruptions in supply networks. 
Hide warehouse owners did, however, have a direct interest in the continued expansion of 
Buenos Aires ranching. There is thus reason to expect a positive effect of hide warehouse 
ownership on propensity to sign the petition, although this effect may not be as strong as  
the saladero ownership effect. 
The remaining major segment of the Buenos Aires dominant class was comprised of 
large ranchers. For purposes of this analysis, all those with a t  least five square leagues of 
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land (about 52 square miles) are considered large ranchers. This assumption is justified 
because the great majority of the land under production in the province was used for 
ranching, and it was extremely unlikely that tracts as  large as  five square leagues would 
be devoted primarily to farming. A minority of those with large land claims rented their 
land to others, but even in these cases the income they derived from the land depended on 
ranching because the renters were almost certainly ranchers. 
Large landholders tended to live in the city and depended on regular access to the 
judicial and police systems to defend their land and cattle, and to encroach on the land and 
cattle of smaller ranchers. They also depended on influence over local authorities to 
maintain control over their peons and small settlers around their ranches. Large ranchers, 
especially those resident in Buenos Aires City, had more to lose from division of the 
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province than any other segment of the dominant class. This leads to the expectation that 
large ranchers were more likely than any other segment of the dominant class to sign the 
petition opposing division of the province. 
I t  is reasonable to expect that, among large ranchers, those with more land were more 
likely to sign the petition because they were more likely to live in the city and thus to have 
direct access to the centers of power located there. They probably also had greater 
capacity to manipulate the existing political system to their advantage, and the potential 
losses from division of the province may have seemed especially clear to them. Large 
ranchers with land spread out around the province probably felt more of a need for 
political and judicial centralization than those with holdings consolidated in one area. 
Those with land in several areas may also have had land in both of the proposed new 
provinces, and they would have had to pursue litigation and influence government officials 
in two country towns rather than one if the province were divided. Thus, controlling for 
the influence of the other variables discussed above, those with more dispersed holdings 
may have been more likely to sign the petition against division. For purposes of this 
analysis, dispersion of landholdings is indicated by the number of rural districts, or 
partidos, in which each individual had land. 
Results 
Table 2 shows the distribution of land within segments of the.dominant class. Import- 
export merchants and salted meat producers, who were generally wealthier than the other 
two .urban elite groups, were more likely to claim land and tended to claim more land than 
did wholesale merchants. (The distribution of land shown for hide warehouse owners is 
not reliable because there are too few of them in the sample.) Within each category of 
urban elites, the majority did not have rural land by 1830. This does not contradict the 
idea that ranching was becoming crucial to the dominant class in the 1820s. Given the 
nature of theFBuenos Aires economy in the 1820s and what we know about the careers of 
many of those who claimed land, there is every reason to believe thas the -wealthier 
members of the urban elite were the most likely to invest in ranches ie.g. Carretero 1970b; 
Galmarini 1974). I t  is also important to keep in mind that these data pertain to 
individuals, not families. The proportion with a family interest in ranching was 
undoubtedly much greater than the proportion with an individual interest in ranching.27 
Table 3 shows the percentage signing the petition against division of the province 
among those who were and were not large landholders within categories of the urban elite, 
as  well as  the percentage signing the petition among those who were large landholders but 
not members of any of the urban class segments. As expected the effect of landholding is 
strong. Within urban elite categories, large landholders were substantially more likely 
than others to sign the petition, and the proportion signing among those who were "only" 
landholders is higher than that for any non-landed urban elite category. Despite the small 
number of cases in some cells, the order of urban elite categories, ranked.by percentage 
27. Zeitlin and Ratcliffe (1988) argue that families rather than individuals should be the 
units of analysis in studies of dominant classes. Gathering the genealogical information 
necessary for such a study of early nineteenth-century Buenos Aires would be a daunting, 
and perhaps impossible, task. 
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signing, is the same for both the landed and the non-landed and is consistent with the 
expectations outlined above. Controlling for land ownership, salted meat factory owners 
were more likely than those in other urban categories to sign the petition. Import-export 
merchants, the group with the most to gain from consolidation of a national state, were the 
least likely to sign the petition. 
The results in Table 3 could be somewhat misleading because the urban class 
segments are not mutually exclusive. Table 4 presents selected logit models using 
categories of economic activity to predict propensity to sign the petition against division. 
These models control for the effects of all variables in each equation and permit more 
rigorous tests of specific hypotheses. Table 5 presents fitted probabilities of signing the - 
petition within categories of the independent variables from model 4 in Table 4: evaluated 
a t  the means of the other variables in the equation. In other words, Tabie 5 shows the 
estimated effect of each independent variable on the probability of signing the petition for 
hypothetical individuals who were "average" on all other vai-iables included in the 
equation. Table 6 shows differences between the coefficients in model 1 (Table 4), along 
with t-statistics that can be used for formal tests of inequality between coefficients. 
In all models in Table 4 the coefficient for the import-export merchant dummy 
variable is nonsignificant and close to zero, which is consistent with the idea that import- 
export merchants had contradictory interests with respect to the issue of dividing the 
province. The reduction of this coefficient when categories for size of landholding are 
introduced in model 2 indicates that much of the slightly positive import-export merchant 
effect estimated in model 1 is due to the presence of some very large landholders among 
import-export merchants. 28 
28. Because it was not possible to identify all foreigners and foreigners were most 
prevalent among import-export merchants, the coefficient for the import-export merchant 
dummy variable may have a slight negative bias. If all unidentified foreigners were 
removed from the sample, this coefficient might be somewhat more positive, although it 
probably would not be nearly as strong as  the coefficients for the other class segment 
variables. 
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The effect of owning a wholesale operation on propensity to oppose division of the 
province is strong and -highly significant. In Table 5, the fitted probability that 
wholesalers signed the petition is over double the fitted probability that those who were not 
wholesalers signed the petition. 
Coefficients for the effects of owning land, a salted meat plant, or a hide warehouse 
are all strongly positive, although the hide warehouse effect is not statistically significant- 
due, presumably, to the small number of individuals in the sample identified a s  hide 
warehouse owners. As anticipated above, the estimated effect of owning or managing a 
saladero is stronger than the effect of owning a wholesale business. Table 5 shows that, 
controlling for the other variables and evaluating the salted meat factory effect a t  the 
means of these other variables, the fitted probability of signing the petition against 
dividing the province is about .33 among salted meat producers, but only about .13 among 
those not involved in salted meat production. Table 6 shows, however, that the difference 
between the coefficient for salted meat factory ownership and that for being a wholesale 
merchant is nonsignificant, although the difference between the salted meat effect and the 
import-export merchant effect is significant a t  the .1  level (one-tailed). 
As expected, the global effect of landholding estimated in model 1 (Table 4) is stronger 
than the effect of being in any of the other economic categories. Table 6 shows that 
differences between the landholder coefficient and each of the other class segment 
coefficients except the hide warehouse effect are all significant a t  a t  least the .05 level in 
one-tailed tests. (The difference between the landholder coefficient and the hide warehouse 
coefficient is significant a t  the .1 level). 
Model 2 in Table 4 includes categories for different amounts of land held. The lowest 
category of landholding is not empty because, although an individual had to have 5 or 
more square leagues of land to be included in the sample as a large landholder, some of 
those included by other criteria had smaller amounts of land. Thus the smaller 
landholders in the sample are not representative of smaller landholders in general because 
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they were members of the urban economic elite. The coefficien for all land categories are 
strong and statistically significant, but there is no noticeable trend or pattern among 
categories below 50 square leagues, indicating that, among landholders with less than 50 
square leagues, the amount of land had little effect on propensity to sign the petition. The 
coefficient for "50 or more square leagues," however, is roughly double the largest 
coefficients for lower categories of landholding. Controlling for the other variables in the 
equation, those who had 50 or more square leagues of land were much more likely than 
other landholders to sign the petition opposing division of the province. In model 4 the 
categories of land area below 50 square leagues are collapsed into one category, with little 
change in the likelihood-ratio x2 for the equation, which indicates that, among landholders 
with less than 50 square leagues, the effect of amount of land is not statistically 
significant. 29 
Models 3 and 4 also include a variable categorizing the number of rural partidos in 
which an individual held land. These models do not include a category for one partido 
because this would produce linear dependency among the independent variables. The 
coefficient for each partidos category is the estimated difference between the log-odds of 
signing the petition among those in that category and the log-odds of signing among those 
with land in only one partido. As expected, the number of partidos in which an individual 
had land does seem to be associated with propensity to sign the petition, net of the amount 
of land held and the other economic position variables. There is a monotonic increase in 
the fitted propensity to sign the petition from those with land in only one partido to those 
with land in two or three partidos, to those with land in four or more partidos. Although 
the joint effect of the number of partidos dummy variables is nonsignificant (x2 = 3.95, 2 
d.f.), the coefficient for the contrast between those with land in four or more partidos and 
29. The change in likelihood-ratio x2 across models is also (asymptotically) distributed as 
x2 with degrees of freedom equal to the change in degrees of freedom across models. Thus 
x2 for the difference between models 3 and 4, which tests for the joint significance of 
landholding categories between 5 and 49.99 square leagues, is approximately 2.8 with 4 
degrees of freedom, which is clearly nonsignificant. 
those with land in only one partido reaches the .05 level of significance in a one-tailed 
test.30 
Part  B of Table 5 shows the fitted probability of signing the petition against division 
within categories of the crosstabulation of number of square leagues and number of 
partidos from model 4. There is a dramatic contrast between those with 50 or more 
square leagues of land and those with less land, with the fitted probability of signing the 
petition ranging from about .72 to about .92 among those with 50 or more square leagues 
and ranging from about .21 to about .55 among those with lesser amounts of land. There 
is also a substantial difference between the fitted probability for those with land in four or 
more partidos and the fitted probability for those with land in less than four partidos. The 
fitted probability for those with no land is only about .04, which is much lower than that 
for those in any of the categories of landholding. The overall pattern suggested by Table 
5b is that, net of the other economic position variables, those with any amount of land 
were substantially more likely than those with no land to sign the petition, and those with 
either very large quantities of land or widely scattered holdings were much more likely 
than other landholders to sign the petition. 
The results of this quantitative analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that, with 
the exception of import-export merchants, all major segments of the Buenos Aires 
dominant class tended to oppose the proposed division of the province. The results are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that members of the dominant class more directly connected 
to the cattle industry or involved in rural economic activities requiring privileged access to 
the judicial and police systems were more likely to oppose division of the province than 
were those in other segments of the dominant class. Some of these results, such as  the 
estimated difference between the effect of salted meat factory ownership and the effect of 
30. When number of partidos is entered as  a scaled variable it is also significant. This is 
true for both logged and unlogged versions of the variable. It is not likely that number of 
partidos is actually a surrogate for the amount of land held in the 50 or more square 
leagues category because most of those with land in four or more partidos had less than 50 
square leagues. 
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being a wholesale merchant, are equivocal because they may well be due to random error. 
On the other hand, these data provide solid evidence that being a large landholder had a 
much stronger positive effect on the likelihood of opposing division of the province than did 
membership in any of the other economic categories. 
The differential propensity of different class segments to sign the petition only 
constitutes indirect evidence that opposition to division among the Buenos Aires dominant 
class was motivated by concern about losing influence over the local and provincial state. 
Taken in combination with the clearly expressed concern about access to courts in the text 
of the petition against division, however, this analysis provides good evidence that 
opposition to division among the dominant class was motivated by the threat of losing 
privileged access to the judicial system. The idea that opposition was also motivated by 
concern about losing other forms of preferential access to state power, such as the ability 
to influence rural Police Commissioners, remains more speculative. 
The issue of division pitted political elites dedicated to building a central state against 
the core of the Buenos Aires dominant class. Additional evidence regarding this question 
emerges when we consider those a t  the very top of the class structure. Only 17 men in 
the sample possessed 50 or more square leagues of land, and 13 of them signed the 
petition against dividing the province. Only nine individuals in the sample both held 50 or 
more square leagues of land and were either an important urban merchant, a salted meat 
factory owner, or a hide warehouse owner, but all of them signed the petition. 
Import-export merchants had greater reason than the rest of the upper class to 
support construction of a central state, and the effect of being an import-export merchant 
on the likelihood of registering opposition to division was substantially weaker than the 
effect of being in any other major segment of the dominant class. Being an import-export. 
merchant, however, did not decrease the probability of signing the petition; it simply had 
no effect. The weakness of the estimated import-export merchant effect indicates that 
statemaking elites could not rely on import-export merchants for support in the conflict 
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over division of Buenos Aires Province. Indeed it is likely that the most powerful import- 
export merchants were the same ones who were diversifying into ranching and salted meat 
production in the 1820s, and thus had compelling reasons to oppose this particular project 
of statemaking elites. The degree to which upper class support for central-staie elites had 
eroded by the end of 1826 is indicated by the fact that the petition against division was 
signed by 9 of the 14 large merchants and financiers identified by Galmarini (1974) as 
major investors in state projects. The issue of dividing Buenos Aires Province may have 
done more than anything else to undermine support for state elites among wealthy 
merchants and investors who had previously supported statemaking projects. 
Dissolution of the Central St& 
The attempt to construct an Argentine state in the 1820s was not able to survive the 
active opposition of the large ranchers and merchants of Buenos Aires. The proposed 
division of Buenos Aires Province never came to a vote in the National Constituent 
Congress, which suspended'all business except that related to the war in late December: 
1826 (Ravignani, ed. 1937, vol. 3. p. 1190). In June of 1827, President Rivadavia 
resigned and, after a brief caretaker government, both the National Constituent Congress 
and the rest of the national government were disbanded. Rivadavia offered his resignation 
because an envoy to Brazil had violated his instructions and signed a peace treaty 
unfavorable to Argentina. The ready acceptance of Rivadavia's resignation and subsequent 
disbandment of the national state, however, had much more to do with lack of support for 
the national government in both Buenos Aires and other provinces, several of which 
rejected the constitution written by the Constituent Congress. 
Opposition by the Buenos Aires dominant class weakened the position of statemaking 
elites in several ways. The most direct manifestation of this opposition was growing 
opposition to the national government among the Buenos Aires delegation in the 
Constituent Congress. In the longer run, state elites were under pressure to attend to the 
needs of the dominant class because the state depended on import and export tariffs for 
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most of its revenue. The state also depended on ranchers for control of rural areas 
because their employees and clients occupied many positions of authority in the 
countryside. Finally, those opposed to the war with Brazil found a powerful ally in Great 
Britain, which wanted to end the war to preserve the flow of trade with the region. In 
1828, Britain helped negotiate a settlement which established the independent state of 
Uruguay in the disputed territory (Ferns 1960, pp. 155-194). 
Although leaders of the other provinces called for a new Constituent Congress and a 
new constitution that would organize the country along more federalist lines, the dominant 
class of Buenos Aires Province manifested little interest in a new congress or constitution 
or any form of reconstituted national state. Members of this class seem to have preferred 
to ignore the other provinces. Argentina would have no form of central political 
organization a t  all until the early 1850s, and Buenos Aires would remain outside the 
subsequent Argentine Confederation until 1860. 
Statemaking. Il 
A central state was not consolidated in Argentina until the late nineteenth century. 
As Oscar Oszlak has shown, the conquest of power by the Argentine state was a long 
process facilitated by new technologes of transport and communication, especially the 
railroad, which aided in the creation of a national market and allowed rapid movement of 
troops sent to put down regional rebellions (Oszlak 1982). To a substantial degree, the 
construction of the central Argentine state and the infrastructural projects that 
accompanied it, especially railroads, were underwritten by British capital (Lewis 1983; 
McMichael 1985; Platt 1972, pp. 278-302; Stone 1962). 
At the same time, new opportunities for export-oriented staple production made the 
landed "oligarchy" of Buenos Aires more amenable to statemaking. The wool boom of the 
1860s led many Buenos Aires ranchers to begin raising sheep and acquiring more land 
(Sabato 1989). All available land in Buenos Aires was soon taken and land further south 
was still held by Indians. According to David Riock, the Province of Buenos Aires could not 
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conquer this "new" land because its troops were repeatedly called away from the frontier 
to fight against other provinces. The large ranchers of Buenos Aires therefore became 
more willing to cooperate in the formation of a national state, which subsequently 
undertook to conquer Patagonia ( b c k  1985, pp. 123-4). Opposition to statemaking by the 
Buenos Aires dominant class was thus undermined by expansion of the frontiers of 
pastoral production into new regions and the military exigencies of this expansion. 
The genocidal "conquest of the desert" was followed by a period of intense land- 
grabbing similar to that of the 1820s, as  Patagonia became incorporated into the world- 
system. During this period, and partly as a result of political alliances formed in the 
process of constructing a national state, the dominant class of Buenos Aires became less a 
regional dominant class and more a national upper class. Wealthy Buenos Aires ranching 
families intermarried with upper class families of' the interior provinces, and Buenos Aires 
ranchers began investing in some of the economic activities of the interior, particularly the 
Tucuma'n sugar industry, thus forming a class with a durable interest in the existence of a 
national state (Gimdnez Zapiola, ed. 1975; Guy 1980; Hollander 1976). 
Conclusions 
The evidence for Argentina is consistent with the idea that dependency may 
undermine statemaking. The effort to build an Argentine state in the early nineteenth 
century led to bitter conflict between state elites and the dominant class of Buenos Aires 
Province. A political elite which had consistently supported the interests of the dominant 
class of large ranchers and merchants found itself driven by the geo-political logic of 
statemaking into acting contrary to some of the most important interests of this dominant 
class. The staple-exporting upper class of Buenos Aires came to oppose the statemaking 
project both because it stood to gain little from the existence of a national state and 
because statemaking disrupted political arrangements on which this class depended for its 
existence as  a class. One form in which this conflict became evident was a struggle over a 
crucial resource for both states and dominant classes, the people who labor or fight. 
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Another form was an intense dispute over political jurisdictions in the territory of Buenos 
Aires which is only understandable with reference to the social relations and geography of 
cattle production in that time and place. 
The results of this case study are suggestive for other early and mid nineteenth- 
century attempts to construct national states in Latin America, and may be validated or 
invalidated for them by studies of other Latin American regions. The theoretical 
framework used here should not, however, be directly applied to other peripheral areas 
and other historical periods. In areas subject to formal colonial domination there is 
generally little latitude for the statemaking projects of indigenous political elites. In the 
twentieth century, the interstate system tends to reinforce the existence of even those 
states that are quite weak relative to dominant classes (Wallerstein 1984, pp. 29-30). 
With the increase in the direct transfer of resources between states in the twentieth 
century, international ties may even strengthen peripheral state elites, especially military 
elites, relative to dominant classes (Tilly 1982) .~ '  
Although the theoretical framework of this paper cannot be directly generalized, a 
focus on interaction between staple-exporting dominant classes and statemaking political 
elites may prove fruitful for studies of peripheral state formation in a wide variety of times 
and places. Such a focus requires recognition by world-system and dependency analysts 
that state elites are actors who must be studied in their own right, and that the goals and 
actions of state elites cannot simply be inferred from putative "needs" of either national 
economies or the world-system as a whole. 
This paper has also highlighted ways in which research on regional productive 
systems and regional politics can contribute to an understanding of peripheral states and 
dominant classes. In peripheral areas, where staple production and export are generally 
31. This is particularly likely to occur in the case of military aid, which mag allow political 
and military elites to join or even displace the pre-existing dominant class. The Somoza 
regime of Nicaragua, for example, was brought to power by US military intervention and 
used the military strength it derived from US aid to increase the economic holdings of the 
Somoza family a t  the expense of the rest of the Nicaraguan dominant class (Paige 1988). 
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regional activities, many of the political issues that  most concern staple-producing and 
exporting dominant classes a re  regional issues, and studies of peripheral politics that  focus 
only on national states are  likely to miss much. 
Appendix A. Data on Economic Elites 
This is not a 100% sample of economic elites. The information on landholdings 
includes land claimed up to 1830 and was drawn from cadastral records by And& 
Carretero (1970a). For land to figure in the cadastral records it had to be measured a t  
some time by government surveyors, which, as Carretero points out, was less likely to 
have occurred in areas of earlier settlement. Fortunately for this study, the principal 
cattle ranching areas were areas of more recent settlement, so those with official claims to 
land in these areas are more likely to be included in the sample. Information on land 
occupied by the many squatters who lived on the plains was not included in the cadastral 
records. In the 1810s, some squatters were owners of large herds with de facto control 
over large tracts of land. During the 1820s, however, powerful squatters were even  
strong incentives to reester official claims to the land they used, a process which involved 
having the land surveyed (Circano 1917). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
squatters who had not claimed land by 1830 were not among large ranchers, and would 
not have been included in the sample of economic elites in any case. 
The information on urban economic elites is also incomplete, as J. J. M. Blondel, the 
editor of the political and commercial almanac for 1826 from which this data is drawn, 
notes in his introduction (Blondel, ed. 1968 [18251). In particular, the 14 hide warehouse 
owners listed in this almanac seem to underrepresent the true number of hide warehouse 
owners, due to the fact that the almanac tends to include only businesses located in the 
city of Buenos Aires. Some hide warehouses were located on the outskirts of the city along 
the banks of the Rio de la Plata or the Riachuelo, a smaller river on the southern edge of 
the city, and some were probably attached to salted meat factories, which by law were 
located outside of the city (due to the overwhelming stench of rotting blood and animal 
parts). Because Blondel's almanac does not include salted meat plants, I have compiled a 
list of salted meat factory owners and managers from a report on cattle slaughtered in 
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these establishments in late 1 8 2 2 , ~ ~  to which I have added the names of salted meat 
entrepreneurs .mentioned as  being active in the 1820s in Alfredo J. Montoya's (1970) 
history of Argentine salted meat factories. 
Women were identified by their first names. Individuals were identified as  foreigners 
if they were identified a s  foreign residents in A Five Years Residence in Buenos Aires (An 
Englishman 1825), or if they had last names that were clearly English, Scotch, Irish, 
French, or German. This procedure is rather rough, and it undoubtedly led to exclusion of 
some Argentines and inclusion of some foreigners. Foreigners were most prevalent among 
import-export merchants, but many were also involved in other branches of economic 
activity, especially salted meat production and ranching. Buenos Aires also had many 
residents of Portuguese descent at. this time, but those with Portuguese names were not 
excluded from the sample because the Portuguese had already been settling in Buenos 
Aires 'for two centuries and there was no influx of Portuguese after independence 
comparable to that of merchants from northwestern Europe and the United States 
(Saguier 1985). I t  is likely that the great majority of those in the sample with Portuguese 
names were Argentine citizens and thus fully eligible for political participation. 
32. "Razon del Ganado bacuno que se ha muerto en 10s Saladeros y Corresponde a1 mes de 
Noviembre" undated. AGN X 12-6-7, Gobierno 1822. 
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